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In recent years, the global reinsurance market has undergone rapid evolution.  A
series of mergers and acquisitions has led to dramatic consolidation, while the
development of insurance-based securities has begun offering new ways to enhance
and/or compete with traditional reinsurance products.  In this article, we employ the
insurance market game framework of Powers, Shubik, and Yao (1994, 1998) and Powers
and Shubik (1999) to study the design of an optimal reinsurance/retrocession market.
Using price in the primary insurance market as our primary objective function, we
analyze market configuration in terms of both the need for additional levels of
reinsurance/retrocession, and the optimal number of firms at a given level.
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1.  Overview
In recent years, the global reinsurance market has undergone rapid evolution.  A
series of mergers and acquisitions has led to dramatic consolidation, while the
development of insurance-based securities has begun offering new ways to enhance
and/or compete with traditional reinsurance products.  These changes naturally give
rise to questions such as:
• Is a reinsurance market really necessary?
• What is the optimal number of reinsurers?
• What is the role of retrocession (i.e., the insuring of reinsurers)?
• Is there a theoretical upper bound on the optimal number of retrocession levels?
As a practical matter, it is difficult to assess the effects of the number and size of
primary insurers on the price and availability of insurance in a given market.  This is
because empirical studies of scale economies can evaluate only the relative efficiencies
of firms of different sizes under a fixed market configuration, and theoretical studies of
market equilibrium are often restricted by traditional assumptions of competitive
equilibrium with infinite numbers of buyers and sellers.  The problem for reinsurance
and retrocession markets is magnified by even greater limitations on industry data, and
the general lack of a formal modeling structure.
1.1.  Previous Work
In Powers, Shubik, and Yao (1994, 1998) and Powers and Shubik (1999), we
proposed a game-theoretic model to study various effects of scale in a primary
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insurance market.  Unlike conventional equilibrium-analysis models, in which buyers
and sellers are assumed to be price-takers, our game-theoretic model permitted the
analysis of market equilibrium with arbitrary numbers of buyers and sellers, so that
marginal changes in competitive forces and insurer solvency could be studied as the
numbers of players changed.
In our previous work, we were able to show that, under certain assumptions,
there is a natural tradeoff between the positive and negative aspects of increasing the
number of firms in a market with a fixed amount of capital.  As the number of firms
increases, the weakening of the oligopolistic structure of the market improves
efficiency, causing price to decrease and customers to purchase more insurance.
However, the increasing number of firms also diminishes the “quality” of insurance (by
lowering the average capital per firm, thereby increasing the probability of insurer
default) eventually causing the customers to purchase less insurance.1  These two
opposing influences determine an optimal number of firms— in terms of maximizing
the amount of insurance purchased— when the marginal changes are equalized.
1.2.  New Results
A natural way in which the dangers of default can be ameliorated, yet
competition can still be preserved, is to introduce a level of reinsurers, even if the total
capital invested in insurance/reinsurance underwriting remains the same.  In this
article, we develop a formal game-theoretic model to examine the potential value of
                                               
1 A further effect of increasing the number of insurers is that the sellers restrict the amount of insurance
they are willing to sell as the price continues to decrease.
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adding a reinsurance structure to the insurance industry.
Specifically, we consider a market game,   G r( ), with one level of primary
insurance and   r  levels of reinsurance.  At each level, we assume a simple, symmetric
model in order to preserve analytical tractability.  However, we are confident that our
qualitative results are independent of this simplification, and we note that it is a
straightforward matter to simulate results for non-symmetric cases.
Because of the complex notation and modeling throughout much of the rest of
the text, we summarize our principal results in this section, as follows:
• Theorem 1 shows that, for an insurance/reinsurance market with an endogenously
imposed configuration, both price and quantity decrease over the reinsurance levels
  λ= 1, 2,K ,r .
• Corollary 1 shows that, for the insurance/reinsurance market of Theorem 1, with
risk neutral reinsurers at and above reinsurance level   L , equilibria exist up to, but
not above, this level.
• One sufficient condition for the desirability of introducing a reinsurance level
imposes a bounded interval on the primary insurer’s risk aversion coefficient,
  σ0 = σ ; this interval tends to shrink if the exogenous probability of the primary
insurer’s insolvency is positive, or the losses are catastrophic (i.e., perfectly
correlated) in nature.
• Given that the reinsurer’s risk aversion coefficient, σλ, decreases over the
reinsurance level, λ, approaching zero (i.e., risk neutrality) as λ→ ∞ , it follows that
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the sufficient “reinsurance desirability” condition eventually imposes an upper
bound on the optimal number of reinsurance levels.
• A simple numerical criterion for the optimal saturation level of a reinsurance market
is given by a monotonically increasing, concave-downward function of the number
of primary insurers, each point of which is found as the solution to a cubic equation
in the number of reinsurers.
• Corollary 2 reveals that, for the insurance/reinsurance market of Corollary 1, in
which insurers/reinsurers are able to coordinate their bids and offers, equilibria do
exist at levels above   L , and these markets are characterized by the purchase of
“over-insurance”.
2.  Statement of the Problem
There are two major difficulties inherent in the study of reinsurance markets—
difficulties that hinder both the collection of empirical data and the development of
appropriate theoretical models.  First, reinsurance is, and traditionally has been, the
most international of insurance markets, with primary insurers in one country often
purchasing reinsurance from both domestic and alien reinsurers.  As a result, it is
difficult to isolate data relating to transactions within only one country, and it is also
difficult to obtain complete and consistent information regarding the global reinsurance
market as a whole.  A second problem is the hazy line that exists between the primary
insurance and reinsurance markets in many countries, where large primary insurers
frequently assume reinsurance business from other primary insurers.
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2.1.  U.S. Insurance/Reinsurance Markets
To simplify matters for our current study, we will restrict attention to the
relatively tractable relationship between domestic U.S. primary property-liability (P-L)
insurers and domestic U.S. “professional” reinsurers (i.e., reinsurers that write no
primary insurance business of their own).  In 1996, these combined
insurance/reinsurance markets consisted of approximately 3,300 primary insurers2
writing $250 billion in premiums, and 72 reinsurers (belonging to 65 reinsurance
groups), writing $19 billion in premiums. 3  We note that this reinsurance market
represents only about 20 percent of the global reinsurance market, and, most notably,
excludes the London and Bermuda markets, which provide substantial capacity for U.S.
primary insurers.4
In the past fifteen years, the reinsurance market has evolved rapidly.  Mergers
and acquisitions have led to dramatic consolidation, reflected in a 26 percent decline in
the number of domestic U.S. reinsurers (from 97 to 72) in the period from 1985 to 1996.5
Over the same time period, the (premium-volume) market share of the 10 largest
reinsurers grew by 12.5 percent (from 60 percent to 65 percent of the total market).6
Since the early 1990s, the development of insurance-based securities, including
various property catastrophe indexes (see Powers and Powers, 1997) and catastrophe
                                               
2 See Insurance Information Institute (1996), p. 5.
3 See Conning and Company (1997), p. 30.
4 In a sense, we are effectively making the coarse assumption that— for purposes of our analysis— the
relationship between the global primary P-L market and the global professional reinsurance market is
similar to that between the corresponding U.S. markets, apart from constant factors to recognize both the
greater volume of the global markets, and the disproportionately smaller U.S. reinsurance market.
5 See Conning and Company (1997), p. 22.
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bonds (e.g., Nationwide Mutual’s $400 million offering of 1995 and USAA/Residential
Re’s $477 million offering of 1997) have provided novel alternatives to traditional
reinsurance products.  The increasing viability and popularity of these alternative
products is undoubtedly one competitive force underlying the consolidation of the
traditional reinsurance market.
2.2.  Studies of Insurance/Reinsurance Market Equilibrium
The theoretical study of insurance and reinsurance market equilibrium has been
carried out under a variety of models.  The earliest formal results were given by Arrow
(1953) and Debreu (1953), who used contingent space to study economic equilibrium in
a simple risk exchange model with two risk averse parties.  By using contingent space,
these authors were able to extend certain fundamental results of economic equilibrium
from an exchange of goods to an exchange of risks.  Specifically, they showed that
competitive equilibrium exists, and proved that both the first and the second social
welfare theorems hold in an economy with uncertainty.  In other words, competitive
equilibrium is Pareto optimal, and every Pareto optimal solution can be supported by a
competitive equilibrium through the redistribution of endowments.
Though contingent space provides an elegant framework for economists to
analyze uncertainty, it is far removed from the reality of most insurance markets.  In
presenting a risk exchange model of the reinsurance market, Borch (1962) argued that
this market should contain only one price, rather than the multiplicity of prices
associated with all possible states in contingent space.  Borch proceeded to provide a
                                                                                                                                                      
6 See Conning and Company (1997), p. 30.
-8-
price/quantity analysis, setting the price of reinsurance equal to expected losses plus a
risk loading proportional to the variance of losses, but found that his competitive
equilibrium results were not consistent with Pareto optimality.
As became clear from the work of Kihlstrom and Pauly (1971), Borch’s model
was over-specified because the form of his risk loading was not consistent with his
assumption that the parties in the risk exchange had quadratic utility functions.7
Kihlstrom and Pauly demonstrated that the single price of insurance is correlated with
the prices of contingent claims, and that the competitive equilibrium of a risk exchange
in price/quantity space is consistent with the competitive equilibrium of a risk
exchange in contingent space.
Subsequently, Baton and Lemaire (1981a, 1981b) applied the Nash bargaining
framework of cooperative game theory to the analysis of a reinsurance market, and
Kihlstrom and Roth (1982) provided a similar analysis of risk transfer between one
insured and one insurer.  Focusing on the case in which the insurer is risk neutral,
Kihlstrom and Roth showed that the equilibrium price of insurance will be actuarially
fair under this assumption, and pointed out that additional results could be proved if
the insurer were assumed to be risk averse.
As noted by Arrow (1996), the risk transfer— as opposed to risk exchange—
model recognizes the reality that the parties in most traditional insurance markets are
either buyers or sellers, and not eligible both to cede and to assume risk as in a risk
                                               
7 See Geanakoplos and Shubik (1990) for a discussion of necessary and sufficient conditions for the Pareto
optimality of competitive equilibrium in a one-good CAPM.
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exchange.  In Powers, Shubik, and Yao (1994, 1998), we first applied the full process
structure of a strategic market game to study equilibrium effects in a risk transfer model
of a primary insurance market.  For a one-period game in which the buyers and sellers
of insurance make strategic bids and offers to determine market price and quantity, we
were able to prove the existence and uniqueness of market equilibrium under certain
conditions.
More recently, in Powers and Shubik (1999), we focused on the relationship
between the law of large numbers (LLN) and the oligopolistic effect of the number of
firms in the market.  For the case of risk neutral insurers, we found that, for certain
reasonable parameter values, there is a natural tradeoff between the effects of the LLN
and oligopoly.  This tradeoff causes both equilibrium quantity and the equilibrium
payoff to customers to possess unique interior maxima over the number of insurance
firms.
3.  Modeling Considerations
Formal economic models require a high level of abstraction.  The precision and
consistency of the model comes at a high price, and one frequently has to guard against
“throwing the baby out with the bath water”— i.e., simplifying the model to the point
that critical features are omitted.  If there are one or more precise questions to be asked,
then it may be possible to build a highly abstract “stripped down” model that provides
answers to these particular questions.  However, there may be many other relevant
questions for which such a model is not adequate.
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In this article, we address the set of questions posed at the beginning of the
Introduction, using a “minimalist” formal model.  We recognize that our portrayal of
the primary and reinsurance markets is somewhat unrealistic, but we believe that the
model as a whole captures the essential statistical and strategic elements of an insurance
market, thereby enabling us to characterize accurately the conditions under which
reinsurance (and retrocession) is desirable, and optimal.
3.1.  The Primary Insurance Market
We now review the formal model of a primary insurance market presented in
Powers, Shubik, and Yao (1994, 1998).  This model employs a Cournot price-formation
mechanism with arbitrary numbers of buyers and sellers, so that marginal changes in
insurer solvency and competitive forces can be studied directly as the numbers of
players change.8
Consider a primary insurance market game with players consisting of   m
homogeneous customers,   i = 1, 2 ,K , m , and   n  homogeneous insurance firms,
  i = 1, 2 ,K , n .  At time 0, let each customer (buyer)   i  have initial endowment
  Bi 0( )= V + A  consisting of one unit of property with replacement value   V  and   A (  ≥ V )
dollars in cash.  Furthermore, let each insurer (seller)   j  have initial endowment
  S j 0( )= R n  dollars of net worth, where   R  is the total amount of capital supplied by
investors to the insurance market.
                                               
8 In this sense, our work is conceptually similar to that of Venezian (1994), who developed a theory of
“pseudo-supply” and “pseudo-demand” curves to account for changes in the “quality” of the insurance
product (i.e., the financial soundness of the insurer) as the number of customers per insurer varies.
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We assume that, during the policy period   0,t[ ], each customer’s property is
subject to a random loss with probability π, and that all losses are total.  The random
variable   δi  equals 1 if customer   i  suffers a property loss during   0,t[ ], and equals 0
otherwise, where the   δi  ~ i.i.d. Bernoulli(π).
3.2.  Strategies
To insure against a potential property loss in   0,t[ ], each customer   i  has the
option of purchasing insurance from some insurer by making a strategic bid,   x i ∈ 0,V[ ],
that represents the amount that he or she is willing to pay for insurance.
Simultaneously, each insurer   j  has the option of offering to sell insurance by making a
strategic offer,   y j ∈ 0, cR n[ ], that represents the total dollar amount of risk that   j  is
willing to assume, where   c > 1  is a solvency constraint imposed by government
regulators.
We assume that all bids and offers are submitted to a central clearinghouse that:
• calculates an average market price of insurance per exposure unit, 
  







                                                                                                                                                      
However, whereas Venezian employed a contingent claims framework to determine a “pseudo-supply”
curve, we use expected utilities to compute the payoffs of both insurers and their customers.
9 Given that   y j = 0  is a permissible offer, it is theoretically possible--although highly unlikely in a real
insurance market--that 
  
y j' = 0
j '=1
n
∑ , causing   P x,y( ) to be undefined.  To avoid this problem, as well as
similar problems associated with 
  
x i ' = 0
i '=1
m
∑ , we take the approach of Dubey and Shubik (1978) and
assume that the clearinghouse furnishes at least one insurer, and one customer per insurer, that must
make non-zero bids/offers.
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• collects all premium bids,   x i , and distributes them to the   n  insurers in proportion to
the insurers’ respective coverage offers,   y j  (i.e., insurer   j  receives the premium
amount   y jP x ,y( ));
• randomly assigns each customer   i  to an insurer   j i( ) so that each insurer ends up
with the same number of customers, µ  (i.e., it is assumed that   n  divides   m  exactly
and that   µ = m n ).
Letting   M j denote the set of customers associated with insurer   j , we assume that
if customer   i ∈ M j  suffers a loss in   0,t[ ], then he or she will receive a loss payment in the
amount 
  








 — i.e., an amount proportional not only to   i ’s premium bid,   x i , but
also to   j ’s coverage offer,   y j .  This loss payment will be bounded above by   V  to reduce
problems of moral hazard.
To recognize the possibility of insurer insolvency during   0,t[ ], let   ηj  be a
Bernoulli random variable that equals 1 if insurer   j  becomes insolvent, and equals 0
otherwise.  If there is an insolvency, it is assumed that government guaranty funds will
pay a fixed proportion   g ∈ 0,1[ ] of all insurance claims made against the insolvent
insurer.10
                                               
10 This assumption is made to facilitate the analysis.  In the U.S., the large majority of state guaranty
funds have been set up in accordance with the National Association of Insurance Commissioners’ Model
Act, which provides for the payment of losses up to a dollar limit (often $300,000); see Duncan (1984).
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3.3.  Payoffs
Given the above development, we see that at time   t  customer   i ’s wealth consists
of
  
B i t( )= 1 − δi( )A + V − x i( )+ δi 1 − η j i( )( )A − x i + y j i( ) x i x h














             
  
+ δiη j i( ) A − x i + gy j i( ) x i x h














and insurer   j ’s wealth equals
  











Note that   Bi t( )≥ 0, but   S j t( ) can take on both positive and negative values.
Now let   uB .() : ℜ → ℜ  denote the utility function of customer   i , for all   i , and
  uS .() : ℜ → ℜ  denote the utility function of insurer   j , for all   j .  It then follows that the
payoffs to customer   i  and insurer   j  are given by
  
E uB Bi t( )( )[ ]= 1 − π( )uB A + V − x i( )+ π 1 − ρj i( )( )uB A − x i + y j i( ) x i xh














                        
  
+ πρj i( )uB A − x i + gy j i( ) x i xh








































ρj i( ) = Pr η j i( )= 1  δi = 1,x ,y{ } and   H r = h1, h2 ,K, hr{ }.
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 Given that an insolvency of insurer   j i( ) at time   t  is equivalent to the event
  S j i( ) t( )≤0 , we note that
  
ρ j i( ) = Pr S j i( ) t( )≤0δi = 1, x , y{ }
  
= Pr R n + y j i( )P x , y( )− y j i( ) x i x h







 − y j i( ) δh x h
h∈M j i( ),h≠ i
∑ x h















which is difficult to evaluate because the random variable 
  
δhxh
h∈M j i( ),h≠ i
∑  has a complicated
probability distribution.  To simplify matters, we assume that   ρj i( ) is given exactly by
the normal approximation for all   i .  Furthermore, since the loss payment
  








 ≤V  will typically be substantially less than   S j i( ) 0( )= R n , it follows that
the effect of any individual   x i  on the ruin probability will generally be insignificant.11




= 0  for all   i .
4.  A Model of Reinsurance and Retrocession
An important aspect of insurance is the pooling of risk.12  However, if all risk is
pooled into a single firm, the customers face a monopolist.  If a society wants to
minimize the need for regulation, it may wish to find an industrial structure which
achieves, or comes close to achieving, the benefits of the pooling of risk while
                                               
11 See Appendix A of Powers and Shubik (1999) for a more rigorous characterization of this assertion.
12 Although pooling may not be a necessary component of all insurance transactions, the benefits of the
LLN that arise from pooling tend to improve the economic efficiency of such transactions (see, e.g., Porat
and Powers, 1999).
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preserving a reasonable degree of competition in the market.  We suggest that the
creation of a reinsurance market contributes to achieving this goal.
We now extend the model presented in Powers, Shubik, and Yao (1994, 1998) by
introducing one or more levels of reinsurers.  Although the second and higher levels of
reinsurance are commonly referred to as “retrocession”, we will adopt a convention of
simply denoting each level of reinsurance by its distance from the primary insurance
market; thus, level “1” will denote the reinsurance of primary insurers, level “2” the
reinsurance of level “1” reinsurers, etc.
In essence, we envision an   r + 1( )-stage strategic game in which there is first an
interaction between the customers and the primary insurers, then an interaction
between the primary insurers and the level 1 reinsurers, etc., through   r  levels of
reinsurance.  The solution to be considered here is a perfect pure strategy non-
cooperative equilibrium (PSNE)— “perfect” in the sense that the equilibrium in the
overall game is also an equilibrium in every sub-game.13
Let   G r( ) denote an insurance market game with one primary insurance market
and   r ∈ 1,2,3,K{ } levels of reinsurance.  The following four assumptions will provide
the basic framework for our analysis.
                                               
13 The detailed specification of information conditions in the extensive form of the game is critical to the
identification of perfect equilibria.  In general, the greater the information, the larger the set of non-
cooperative equilibria becomes.  We conjecture that a PSNE exists for all twice-differentiable utility
functions characterizing the risk aversion of customers, insurers, and various levels of reinsurers.
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Assumption 1:  There are




1 − e− βw
β
,

















where   m > n0 > n1 > K > nr > 1 and   β > σ0 ≥ σ1 ≥ K≥σr ≥ 0 .
Assumption 2:  The primary insurers make offers   y j 0
0( ) and bids   x j 0
1( ), the reinsurers at
level   λ∈ 1,r − 1[ ] make offers   y j λ
λ( ) and bids   x j λ
λ+ 1( ), and the reinsurers at level   r  make
offers   y j r
r( ), where:  (1) all primary insurers and reinsurers make their offers
independently of their bids, and (2) price determinations, premium distributions, and
customer assignments are made at each level by a central clearinghouse.
Assumption 3:  Letting   M k
1( ) denote the set of primary insurers associated with level 1
reinsurer   k , it follows that if insurer   j ∈ M k
1( ) suffers a loss in   0,t[ ], then it will receive a
loss payment in the amount 
  
yk
















∑  (i.e., an amount proportional not only
to   j ’s premium bid,   x j
1( ), but also to   k ’s coverage offer,   yk
1( )), and that an analogous loss
payment rule is applied at each higher level of reinsurance   λ∈ 2, r[ ].
-17-
Assumption 4:  The conditional probability of insolvency of the primary insurer   j ,
given a loss associated with customer   i ∈ M j
0( ), is 
  
ρj i( ) = Pr ηj i( ) = 1  δi = 1, x
λ( ), y λ( ){ }, and
the reinsurers at all levels   λ∈ 1,r[ ] remain solvent with probability 1.










 − R0 + P1 *Q1 * − P0 *Q0 *( )+ 1 + µ0 − 1( )π













(ii)   Q0 * = f P0 *( ) denote the solution of the equation
  
1 − π( )e − βV + π 1 − ρ *( )e−
βQ 0 *






 + πρ *e
− βgQ0 *
m 1 −







in all subsequent results.
The following theorem presents the fundamental result for our insurance market
game,   G r( ).
Theorem 1:  If Assumptions 1 through 4 hold,14 then there exists a unique type-
symmetric pure strategy equilibrium for   G r( ) in which:
(i) the equilibrium price at reinsurance level λ∈ 1,r[ ] is given by 
  
Pλ* = P0 *






 n v − 1 − 1









                                               
14 In addition to Assumptions 1 to 4, certain regularity conditions— analogous to conditions identified in



































σ rQ r *






denotes the equilibrium price in the primary insurance market; and
(ii) the equilibrium quantity at reinsurance level λ∈ 1,r[ ] is given by 
  

































































∏ ≡ 1 , and   Q0 * = f P0 *( ) denotes the equilibrium 
quantity in the primary insurance market.
Proof:  The proof of this theorem is provided in the Appendix.                                          n
5.  The Case of Risk Neutral Reinsurers
If the reinsurers at all levels   λ∈ L,r[ ] are risk neutral (i.e.,   σλ → 0 for   λ∈ L,r[ ]),
then we are able:  (1) to provide explicit analytical forms for   P0 * and   Q0 *, and (2) to
show that equilibria do not exist for reinsurance levels   λ∈ L + 1, r[ ].
Corollary 1:  If Assumptions 1 through 4 hold, and if the reinsurers at all levels   λ∈ L,r[ ]
are risk neutral (i.e.,   σλ → 0 for   λ∈ L,r[ ]), then there exists a unique type-symmetric
pure strategy equilibrium for   G r( ) in which:
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 n v − 1 − 1
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denotes the equilibrium price in the primary insurance market;
(ii) the equilibrium quantity at reinsurance level   λ∈ 1,L[ ] is given by 
  








































where   Q0 * = f P0 *( ) denotes the equilibrium quantity in the primary insurance 
market; and
(iii) equilibrium price and quantity do not exist for reinsurance levels   λ∈ L + 1, r[ ].
Proof:  The proof is provided in the Appendix.                                                                      n
5.1.  Analysis— When Is Reinsurance Desirable?
Using the results of Corollary 1, we are able to explore and characterize
conditions under which it is desirable, on the margin, to introduce a level of
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reinsurance— a problem that is conceptually similar for all reinsurance levels   λ≥ 1 .  To
this end, we compare the price of insurance in the primary insurance market under two
alternatives.  The first alternative, denoted by   A , is a primary insurance market in
which the number of primary insurers is increased by 2.  The second alternative,   B , is
the same primary insurance market, except that the number of primary insurers
remains fixed, while we add a reinsurance level with 2 risk neutral reinsurers.15
For both alternatives, we assume that there are   m  identical primary insurance
customers (each with constant risk aversion coefficient β ), and (initially)   n0  identical
primary insurers (each with constant risk aversion coefficient   σ0 = σ < β ).  In addition,
we assume that the primary insurers are subject to exogenous i.i.d. insolvency perils ~
Bernoulli ρ( ), and that the customers receive no loss payments following an insurer’s
insolvency (i.e.,  g = 0).  Finally, under alternative   B , we assume that the reinsurers
remain solvent with probability 1.
From Equations (8) and (7) of Powers and Shubik (1999), we obtain the following
expressions for price and quantity, respectively, in the primary market under













A( ) m + 1 − π
,                                                                                            (1)
                                               





A( ) = − m
β
ln
1 − π( )e− βV + πρ












































.                                                             (2)
Similarly, from Corollary 1 above, we obtain the following expressions for price and
quantity, respectively, under alternative   B :
  
P0












 π,                                                                                        (3)
  
Q0
B( ) = − m
β
ln
1 − π( )e− βV + πρ












































.                                                                    (4)
We now consider under what conditions alternative   B  (the creation of
reinsurance) provides a lower price in the primary market than does alternative   A
(primary market expansion); i.e., when   P0
B( ) < P0

























A( ) m + 1 − π
.










1 − e− σQ 0
A( ) m
,                                                                                                   (5)
where 
  
























 on the horizontal axis, and π
on the vertical axis, Inequality (5) may be denoted by the region between Curve (I) and
the horizontal axis in Figure 1 below.







1 − εn 0
2















B( ) < P0
A( )
  P0
B( ) > P0
A( )
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 and π in
equilibrium.  Rearranging Equation (2), we find that
  
π = 1
1 − ρ( ) 1 − εm ,n0
P0






− β Q 0
A( ) m( )− V      + 1 − ρeβV







The Case of No Insolvencies
For the moment, let   ρ = 0 , so that
  
π = 1
1 − εm ,n0
P0






− β Q 0
A( ) m( )− V      + 1
.
This equation is then plotted as Curve (II) in Figure 2 below.
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Figure 2.  A Sufficient Condition for Reinsurance Desirability
From this second figure, it can be seen that a sufficient condition for there to exist
a region such that   P0
B( ) < P0
A( ) is that Curve (II) be lower than Curve (I) at the upper










= V .  This sufficient condition is
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πeσV + 1 − π
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 < 0 ,                                          (9)
where   y = e
− σV , 
  
k1 =







1 − εm , n0( ), and   k2 = 1− εn0 .
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To simplify the mathematics, we assume that   m >> n0 >> 0 , so that   k1 ≈1 and
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 ,                    (10)





The Case of Potential Insolvencies
If we now let   ρ > 0 , we easily can see from Equation (6) that this has the effect of
shifting Curve (II) upward, thereby reducing the size of the potential interval in which
  P0
B( ) < P0
A( ).
The Case of Catastrophe Losses
For the case of (perfectly correlated) catastrophe losses, the analysis is very
similar to the non-catastrophe case.  All of the expressions for price and quantity in the
primary market remain the same, except for the expression for price under
alternative  A , which now becomes
                                               


















A( ) m + 1 − π







Following the same analysis as before, we find that both Curves (I) and (II) are
compressed to the left— although not in the same proportions— yielding the sufficient
condition for   P0





























                    (10’)




).  Clearly, condition (10’) is substantially more restrictive than
condition (10), suggesting that the potential benefit of reinsurance on price in the
primary market may be much more limited in the catastrophe context.
5.2.  Analysis— When Are There Enough Reinsurers?
We now seek to identify conditions under which the reinsurance market is
saturated— i.e., under which it is no longer desirable, on the margin, to introduce an
additional risk neutral reinsurer rather than an additional primary insurer (with risk
aversion coefficient σ ).  As we will see, this problem is conceptually similar for all
reinsurance levels   λ≥ 1 .
We begin by comparing the price of insurance in the primary insurance market
under two alternatives.  The first alternative, denoted by   C , is a primary insurance
market with one level of reinsurance, where the primary market has   n0  insurers, and
the reinsurance market has   n1  reinsurers.  The second alternative,   D , is the same
-28-
primary insurance market, except that the number of primary insurers is increased by
one (to   n0 + 1), while the number of reinsurers is decreased by one (to   n1 − 1).  To
identify the point at which the number of reinsurers has reached its optimal saturation
level, we solve for the maximum value of   n1  such that   P0
C( ) < P0
D( ); i.e.,
  n1 * = Max n1 :π ≤P0
C( ) < P0
D( ) ≤1{ }
      
  































 n0 + 1













Interestingly, this saturation level may be found as the solution to a cubic
equation in   n1 .  In the figure below, we provide the saturation level for a wide range of
primary market sizes, and, for comparison purposes, we also include the actual
domestic U.S. insurance/reinsurance market figures for 1985 and 1996.  Intriguingly,
we observe that, as the U.S. market consolidates, its position on the graph appears to
follow a trajectory toward the idealized market curve.
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Finally, we note that for reinsurance levels   λ≥ 2 , Equation (11) generalizes to
  nλ* = Max nλ :π ≤P0
C( ) < P0
D( ) ≤1{ }
            
  

























   
 












 nλ− 1 + 1











   
 
,
which also may be found as the solution to a cubic equation in   nλ.
5.3.  A Market with Correlated Strategies
If we modify the model to permit the risk neutral reinsurer at level   λ∈ L,r − 1[ ] to
make its offer as an explicit function of its bid, then there do exist equilibria for levels
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  λ∈ L + 1, r[ ], characterized by the purchase of “over-insurance” by all risk neutral
reinsurers.
Corollary 2:  If the premises of Corollary 1 hold, but Assumption 2 is relaxed so that the
risk neutral reinsurers at levels   λ∈ L,r − 1[ ] are able to make their offers as explicit
functions of their bids (i.e., 
  
y j λ
λ( )= ϕλ x jλ
λ+ 1( )( )), then there exists a (non-unique) type-
symmetric pure strategy equilibrium for   G r( ) in which:
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denotes the equilibrium price in the primary insurance market; and
(ii) the equilibrium quantity at reinsurance level λ is given by 
  















































































































 for   λ∈ L + 1, r[ ],
where   Q0 * = f P0 *( ) denotes the equilibrium quantity in the primary insurance 
market.
Proof:  The proof is provided in the Appendix.                                                                      n
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1:
Payoff Expressions
First, note that the payoffs to the primary market customers, the primary market
insurers, the level 1 reinsurers, etc., are given as follows:
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First-Order Conditions— Primary Insurance Market
Now consider the first-order conditions for the primary insurance market.  Given




0( ) = 0 , it follows that:
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Setting the above derivative equal to 0 yields
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m
πe
σ 0 Q 0 * − Q1 *( )
m + 1 − π ,                        (A1)
where we have used the facts that, for   W ~ Binomial µ0 ,π( ),
  E e
zW[ ]= πez + 1 − π( )µ 0
and
  
E We zW[ ]= ∂∂z E e
zW[ ]= µ0 πez + 1 − π( )µ 0 − 1πez .
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First-Order Conditions— Level 1 Reinsurance Market
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Seller’s First-Order Condition— Level 2 Reinsurance Market
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Reinsurance Market, Level λ
By induction on (A2) and (A4), we see that
  
Pλ* = P0 *






 n v − 1 − 1








∏                                                                              (A5)
for   λ∈ 1,r[ ].  Moreover, it follows from (A1) and (A3) that
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y * 1( ) = µ1y *
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and so by induction,
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for   λ∈ 1,r[ ].
For   λ= r + 1 , we know that   y *
r + 1( ) = 0 , and so
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Proof of Corollary 1:
Given that reinsurers at level   L  and above are risk  neutral, we find that the




























































for   λ∈ 1,L[ ], and then from (A6) that
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for   λ∈ 1,L[ ].
To see what happens at reinsurance level   L + 1  (and above), consider the simple
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 < 0 .
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Thus, the optimal amount of reinsurance for the risk neutral primary insurer is 0.
Analogous results hold for higher levels of reinsurance in which the reinsurers are risk
neutral.
Proof of Corollary 2:
As in the proof of Corollary 1, consider the simple case in which   L = 0 , and let
  y j
0( ) = ϕ 0 x j
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′x * 1( )( )=



















 P0 * − π .                                                         (A8)
Solving (A8) as a differential equation (subject to the boundary condition
  ϕ 0 0( )= 0) yields
  y *
0( ) = ϕ 0
′x * 1( )( )x * 1( ),
which generalizes to
  
y * λ( )= ϕλ
′x * λ+ 1( )( )x * λ+ 1( )
  
⇔  Qλ* = nλϕλ
′x * λ+ 1( )( )x * λ+ 1( )                                                                              (A9)
for   λ∈ L,r − 1[ ], where
  
ϕλ
′x λ+ 1( )( )=



















 Pλ * − π
.
The fact that (A7) and (A8) are equivalent implies that the entire system of first-
order conditions is underspecified, with   r − L  degrees of freedom.  Thus, any
equilibrium solution will not be unique.  However, to maintain continuity between the
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solution for the case at hand (i.e.,   σλ → 0 for   λ∈ L,r[ ]) and the solution for the case in
which only the reinsurer at level   r  is risk neutral (i.e.,   σλ > 0 for   λ∈ L,r − 1[ ], but
  σr → 0 ), we may impose the   r − L  conditions
  
Pλ* = P0 *
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for   λ∈ L + 1, r[ ].
For this solution to be feasible, it must be true that all of the risk neutral
reinsurers are better off by entering equilibrium than by remaining out of the market.
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Rewriting (A10) yields
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where we make use of the fact that 
  
y * L( ) =  ̃y * L( ) = ϕ L




























x * L + 1( ).
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x * L+ 1( ) > 0 ,
which is true because 
  
µL + 1
µL+ 1 − 1
> nL
nL − 1
 (from Assumption 1).
Finally, (A11) follows by substituting λ for   L  in the proof of (A10), and noting
that the right-hand side of (A11) is smaller than that of (A10).
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